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• AI is just a change in technology—perhaps a dramatic one
• Both replacing labor
• And augmenting labor—increasing its power (sometimes called IA, intelligence assisting 
machines)
• Raising questions about change in shape of sectoral and aggregate production functions
• Analysis can be embedded in model of localized technological change
• Except for issue of singularity (where machines are smarter, stronger, and cheaper than 
humans) analysis is little different from standard analysis of technological change




• Growth of labor-replacing robots will lead to even more inequality and 
unemployment, so bad that society will actually be worse off, even if a few 
individuals are better off
• Machines have long been stronger than humans, better able to do many physical 
jobs
• Computers are better at processing large amounts of information
• AI means that robots may even be better at learning
• Extent to which they can replace or outperform humans in immediate future 
uncertain—large variance in estimates
• Alternative perspective:  robots (AI) will be labor augmenting, increasing 
productivities of large proportion of population
• This paper sets problem in more abstract analysis of consequences of economy 
wide labor replacing robots
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Outline of approach and results
• Will employ a series of related models to bring out key insights
• Some of these are well known, others less so
• All are very stylized, and can be greatly enriched
• In next 4 slides, I will summarize major results, but then present 
the analysis in what I hope is a more pedagogic manner
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Case I.  No government 
intervention 
• Without government intervention, there can be welfare 
immiserizing technological change
• It is possible that most individuals are worse off
• Such an outcome can arise if there are significant intersectoral
mobility costs
• It can occur whether there are efficiency wages limiting wage 
reductions or not
• It is even more possible that with any inequality averse social 
welfare function, social welfare is decreased
• This is true even with individualistic social welfare functions, so long 
as there is some good (land) which is not being augmented (enough) 
by the process of technological change
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No government intervention:  
dynamics
• Analysis predicated on endogenous determination of factor bias of 
innovation
• Without government intervention, there may be a self-equilibrating 
process which limits the reduction in, say, the share of unskilled 
labor; but there are conditions under which this process does not 
work
• But with efficiency wages, there is a market bias towards excessive 
labor saving innovation, i.e. towards a dynamic equilibrium with too 
much unemployment
• Each firm doesn’t take into account the effect of its innovation policy on the 
aggregate unemployment rate—typical case of a macro-economic externality
• Broader perspective:  there is no presumption that the market is efficient in the pace 
or direction of innovation, selection of research projects
• There are systematic bias
• This bias may be especially large in agency models, where manager makes 
decision on R & D, and puts excessive weight on his personal costs of managing 
unskilled workers.  (standard governance result)
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Dynamics
• The dynamics even in a simple model looks markedly different from 
that in a standard growth model, and main entail oscillatory 
convergence  
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Case II:  Government Intervention
• With government intervention, normally everyone can be 
made better off
• There are a range of interventions, including tax and intellectual 
property policies
• Revenues from taxes can be used to supplement pay of unskilled 
labor in service sector jobs that are unlikely to be replaced by AI and 
for training to transition into sectors unaffected by AI
• Myopic monetary policy may exacerbate periods of unemployment
• Rich research agenda ahead:  optimal AI, employment, wage, 
active labor market, and IPR policies
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I. No presumption that 
innovation is welfare enhancing
• No first theorem of welfare economics when technology is 
endogenous
• Arrow and Debreu assumed fixed technology
• Much of support for market economy based on innovation
• Schumpeter argued for advantages of monopoly
• Subsequent research showed that all of presumptions underlying 
Schumpeter’s analysis were wrong (monopolies would be 
temporary, contest to be monopolist ensured fast pace of 
innovation, contestability ensured that monopolist couldn’t 
exploit market power)
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Presumption that market economies on 
their own are not efficient in innovation
• Subsequent work explained why presumption against efficiency
• Innovation as a public good
• IPR restricted dissemination, use, even pace of innovation (most important 
ingredient into research is knowledge)
• Innovation is inherently risky, marked by imperfect information and 
incomplete insurance markets
• Greenwald-Stiglitz 1986 showed that whenever markets were incomplete and 
information was imperfect, markets are not constrained Pareto efficient
• Knowledge can be viewed as a form of information
• Inefficiency in the production of knowledge
• Also, fixed costs associated with innovation gives rise to imperfect 
competition (sometimes can be modeled as monopolistic competition, 
sometimes as oligopolistic competition)  
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II. This paper explores one dimension of these 
inefficiencies related to AI:  Factor Biased 
Innovation
• Series of simple models (variants of models already in the 
literature)
• Central argument:  tendency for excessive “labor saving 
innovation”
• Combining standard model of efficiency wages (explaining 
unemployment) with standard theories of biased 
technological change
(Based on Stiglitz, “Unemployment and Innovation,” NBER Working Paper 20670, November 2014 
and  “Samuelson and the Factor Bias of Technological Change,” Samuelsonian Economics and the 
Twenty-First Century, M. Szenberg et al, eds., Oxford University Press: New York, 2006, pp. 235-251 
and Stiglitz and Greenwald, Creating a Learning Society: A New Approach to Growth, Development, 
and Social Progress, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. Reader’s Edition published 2015, 




Q = F(μK, λL)
where {μ, λ} are capital and labor augmenting 
innovation, respectively
Simple model:  fixed coefficients technology(results easily generalized)
Q/K = b, Q/L = a
Innovation frontier:  given at, bt
(1)  bt+1 = z (at+1)
Cost minimization entails
Min w/a + r/b
Implying 
Z ≡ dln z/dln a = -sL/sK 13
Broad interpretation
• Costs as perceived by “decision maker”
• Agency issues
• Managerial costs of labor
• Search costs for labor
• Interpretation of “scarcity of labor” (Habakkuk, 1962, and Salter, 1962)
• Differences between these costs and social (shadow) prices will 
play a role in the following discussion
• When there is unemployment, shadow price of labor differs from 
market price
• Importance of macroeconomic externalities 14
Cost minimization
In general, firm has to think of dynamic path of factor prices.  Two simplifications
a. Steady state—firm believes wages increase smoothly at a given rate and cost of capital 
will be fixed; firm’s cost minimization sustains that steady state equilibrium.
b. if knowledge produced at t for t + 1 becomes publicly available at t + 2, then firm only 
focuses on “private” benefits of innovation, which occur at time t + 1.
• With symmetric equilibrium, all firms do same thing; most of following discussion 
focuses on symmetric equilibrium 
• May be more than one steady state equilibrium
• In more general model, direction of innovation could differ across sectors
• In more general model, innovation changes shape of production function
• Localized technological change (Atkinson-Stiglitz, 1969) emphasizes innovation as 
specific to particular activities, changing shape of production function
• History matters—episode of low interest rates can have long lasting effects
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Characterization of cost 
minimization
• With concave innovation frontier, cost minimization implies that 
larger share of labor, more labor saving innovation; the larger the 
share of unskilled labor relative to skilled labor (at “perceived 
prices”) the more skilled biased technological change  (see figure)
• If endogenously determined bias of technological change works as it 
should, as wages get low, focus is on capital and resource 
augmenting technical change
• Limiting decline in share of labor (in stable equilibrium) and in 
inequality
• (Can describe dynamics with standard wage-setting mechanism:  
system stable so long as elasticity of substitution is less than unity)
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III. Consequences of labor saving 
innovation
• If the economy is able to achieve full employment, equilibrium wage is 
lowered—workers worse off
• With inequality averse social welfare function, social welfare lowered unless 
there is redistribution
• Redistribution may be costly—in which case it may be impossible to achieve welfare 
improvement
• Welfare enhancing redistributions are economically feasible—the question is, will 
they occur
• Increased wealth of “capitalists” increases their ability 
• to resist redistributions
• to reduce progressivity of taxation or make it regressive (as has happened in US)
• Inducing firms to engage in more rent-seeking behavior, increasing inequality still further
(Based in part on Kornek and Stiglitz, 2017, “Artificial Intelligence and Its Implications for Income Distribution and 
Unemployment,” forthcoming NBER volume)
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Technological possibilities and utility
Consider arrival of a new technology that replaces workers.
Would their standard of living necessarily collapse?
1) If (i) the world is 1st-best and (ii) redistribution is costless,
the utility possibilities frontier (UPF) moves out (even if competitive 
equilibrium wage decreases):























Consider arrival of a new technology that replaces workers.
Would their standard of living necessarily collapse?
2) If (i) the world is 1st-best but (ii) redistribution is limited, the 
constrained utility possibilities frontier (UPF) may not lie outside the 
original schedule:
 Limiting technological change may be desirable for workers 
and for social welfare
Figure 3
Technological possibilities and utility
More generally: the 1st-best UPF is the outer envelope of all possible constrained 
UPFs, which reflect all possible institutional regimes, e.g.:
• explicit redistribution systems
• intellectual property regimes
• market arrangements (e.g. market power)
• social norms (e.g. about charity or social equity)
 changing any of these institutions may improve workers’ welfare
If redistribution is limited, may have to rely more on other institutional 
changes
 Limits on IP limit rents that accrue to innovators; may also limit pace of innovation
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Technological possibilities and utility
Consider arrival of a new technology that replaces workers.
Would their standard of living necessarily collapse?
3) If the world is not 1st-best, the utility possibilities frontier may
move inwards (even with costless distribution):













Incentives for Innovation and Welfare
No 1st welfare theorem for innovation:  Privately optimal 
innovation may shift the utility possibilities frontier inward 
(even with costless redistribution)
Intervening in the innovation process may generate Pareto 
improvements
(Examples: high-frequency trading; markets focusing on 
unskilled labor replacing innovation, even when shadow price 
of labor is low, ignoring importance of carbon innovation) 22
Critical question: public policy
• Are there public policies which would ensure that everyone 
would be better off?
• Political economy:  will these policies emerge out of our 
political processes?
We focus only on first question.  
Constructs two simple models analyzing: 
(a) What happens when machines replace workers?  
(b) What are long run consequences of different policies?
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IV.  Machine Labor and Factor 
Earnings
Proposition 1: Machine Labor and Factor Earnings (short-run, before other factors 
adjust): adding a marginal unit of machine labor reduces human wages but increases 
returns of complementary factors in a zero-sum manner
Euler’s Theorem:  𝐻𝐻 + 𝑀𝑀 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 � + 𝐾𝐾𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾 � = 𝐹𝐹 𝐾𝐾,𝐻𝐻 + 𝑀𝑀
Additional unit of M:        𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 + 𝐻𝐻 + 𝑀𝑀 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝐾𝐾𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿 = 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿
or simplified:                           𝐻𝐻 + 𝑀𝑀 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑 𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
+ 𝐾𝐾𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 𝐾𝐾
= 0
 adding machine labor creates redistribution toward complementary factors
= pecuniary externality
 increased returns for complementary factor owners are like unearned rents
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Machine Labor and Factor Earnings
Proposition 1 holds for all factors in the production function, e.g.:
• Labor vs capital
• Labor vs land
• Unskilled labor (replaced by machines) vs skilled labor
• Labor vs Entrepreneurial rents
 policy can undo the redistribution by taxing unearned rents
 taxes on previously accumulated factors are non-distortionary 
(they automatically identify out-of-equilibrium returns)
at the margin, Pareto-improvement
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Panglossian world: singularity
Labor is most important factor of production
 scarcity of labor = biggest constraint on output
machine labor makes this factor easily reproducible 
Proposition 2: Machine Labor and Singularity: if machine labor is 
sufficiently cheap and all other factors are also reproducible, the 
economy experiences a singularity, leading to:
• exponential growth driven by factor accumulation (AK-style)
• unchanged level of wages, but human labor share  0
 outcome benign if workers care about absolute level of labor 
earnings 26
The Return of Scarcity
Although singularity may lead to significant growth, it is likely it will eventually be 
limited by scarcity of other non-reproducible factors, e.g. land or energy
Proposition 3: Machine Labor and Return of Scarcity: if there are non-reproducible 
factors, they will eventually limit growth 
• human wages fall; owners of non-reproducible factors absorb all the rents
• at the margin, redistribution from workers to non-reproducible factor owners is 
zero sum
• taxes on non-reproducible factors are by definition non-distortionary
scope for non-distortionary redistribution; at the margin Pareto improvement
Technological change gives rise to rents which can be taxed, and revenues used 
to compensate workers
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Malthusian perspective on the 
proliferation of artificial intelligence
• If basic human intelligence is made redundant and the marginal product of 
human labor would fall below the human subsistence level, if 
redistribution is deemed infeasible, society faces two unpleasant 
alternatives:  
• halting AI or 
• allowing Malthusian forces to play out.  
Extended utilitarian traditions provide a way of approaching this choice
The scope for redistribution is facilitated by the fact that the changes in factor 
prices create windfall gains on the complementary factors and that should 
make it rather easy to achieve Pareto improvements
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Intellectual Property Rights and 
Redistribution
If outright redistribution is infeasible, intervention to steer 
technological progress may act as a 2nd-best device
Example: assume we have a distortionary tax τ leading to capital 
K(τ) and machine labor M(z) is function of patent life z.
Q = F(K(τ), M(z) + H)
Government maximizes social welfare W w.r.t. τ and z ≥ z*, where 
M(z*) = 0 29
Maximizing well-being of 
workers
Define ?̂?𝜏(M) as value of tax, redistributed to workers, which keeps 
workers just as well off.  Representative worker income I is given 
by
I = w + ?̂?𝜏 K(τ)/H
Where w = FL :  workers’ receive marginal product
Machines decrease marginal product (compete with humans).  
Hence, as M increases, τ must increase.  But increase in τ
decreases capital stock, and that hurts workers.  
Proposition 4:  So long as the  elasticity of capital supply is not 
too large, we can always increase τ and compensate workers
30
Reframing the issue (heuristic) 
• Assume a growth rate g(z, τ), function of the length of the patent and tax rate, 
assume b(z, τ) fraction of output that can be appropriated by innovator, then 
p.d.v. of income of workers approximately given by
Y* =  (1 – b (1 – τ))(1 – c(g)/ 1 + g – δ
If we choose {z, τ} to maximize Y*, in general, the optimum will not be a corner 
solution in which innovation necessarily hurts workers
We can extend that to include capital, skilled and unskilled workers.
Implication: 
Proposition 5: In general, the optimal {z*, τ *} entails g > 0.
i.e. t.c. can improve well-being of workers, but pace of t.c. that maximizes workers 
likely to be well below maximal feasible pace, or even pace which maximizes well-
being of innovators 31
How to help ensure evolution of technology is 
likely to be welfare increasing
• Economy will be evolving towards service sector economy
• Among key service sectors are education, health, and other public services
• Value of those services is largely socially determined—not “just” a market process
• If we value those services highly—pay good wages, provide good working conditions, and 
create sufficient number of jobs—that will limit growth in market income inequality
• Including jobs with limited skill requirements
• Higher pay will result in such jobs having higher “respect”
• Private sector wages will follow public sector wages
• May need also to provide wage subsidy for low wage jobs, to encourage demand for such jobs 
and increase wages




• Human jobs provide not only income but also mental services 
in the form of meaning, status, and fulfillment
• If this is so, shift from focusing on pure redistribution of 
income to generation of jobs or other activities
• But this could be just a characteristic of current generation
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• Under these conditions, benefits of growth can be shared 
equitably, and in ways that ensure full employment
• Larger pie—so everyone can be better off
• Such an outcome is economically feasible
• But economy may not go in that direction
• Politics matters
• And even the conditions for economic feasibility are restrictive
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V.  Labor saving innovations, efficiency wages, and unemployment
To analyze unemployment, need a “theory” of unemployment
Efficiency wages provides a simple well-grounded theory
With efficiency wages, labor saving innovations lead to higher unemployment and lower wages
Q = F(μK, λL)
where {μ, λ} are capital and labor augmenting innovation, respectively.  In short run, we take capital, K, 
and labor, L,  as fixed
Real wage w = λ [f – κf’], where κ is effectively capital labor ratio (μK/ λL).  If firm takes K and μ as 
given, this solves for employment E, as a function of w and λ.  (Note in this context κ= K/E. )
Labor saving innovation shifts demand for labor down at each value of the real wage (for fixed {K,μ})
(1) E = ψ (w; λ)
where E is employment level
• Efficiency wage:  the real wage is a function of the unemployment rate, which we write as               
w = ξ*(U), or since at any moment, the unemployment rate is just a function of the level of 
employment, 
(2) w = ξ(E), 
With ξ’ > 0. 
Equilibrium is solution to (1) and (2).  By definition, Hicks labor saving innovation leads to lower w and 
employment (higher unemployment).  Whether labor augmenting innovation as above leads to lower 
or higher wages depends on the elasticity of substitution.  
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Private profit maximization leads to 
excessive labor saving innovation
Assuming that costless redistributions are possible, social welfare is maximized by 
maximizing national output with respect to λ, taking into account the effect of λ on the 
unemployment rate: 
max F(μK, λ(1 – U)L)
where U is the unemployment rate, i.e.,
d(lnQ)/d(lnλ) = {F1 λ Z'K +F2[(1 - U) λL] - wλL dU/d(lnλ)}/Q
= [rμK d(lnμ)/d(lnλ) + (1 – U)Lλ w - wλL dU/d(lnλ)]/Q 
=    sk d(lnμ)/d(lnλ) + (1 – sk){1 + d[ln (1 -U)]/d(lnλ)}
At the private sector optimization, this is < or > 0 as dU/dln λ > or < 0: 
There is excessive labor-augmenting innovation if the effect of innovation is to increase 
the unemployment rate, i.e. if σ < 1. 
If elasticity of substitution is less than unity, labor augmenting t.c. is labor saving.
Converse results hold if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one
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Complex dynamics of adjustment and multiple momentary equilibria
• High wages lead to labor augmenting innovation, reducing demand for labor, 
lowering wages
• Low wages lead to capital augmenting innovation, resulting in large increases 
in demand for labor from any given level of investment
• In life cycle model, if workers think (rationally) that the rate of return will be 
high, they will save (and invest) little, in which case wages will be low and the 
return to capital will be high
• But if they believe that the rate of return will be low, they will save (and invest) a 
lot, in which cases wages will be high and return to capital will be low
• Effects moderated by factor biased innovation
• Multiplicity of momentary equilibrium easy to generate, but does not hold for all 
preferences, production functions
• When there is multiplicity of momentary equilibrium, there are an infinite number 
of paths consistent with rational expectations
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Dynamics:  simple case with fixed coefficients
and fixed savings rate (results can be generalized)
I = sQ = dK/dt
s is the savings rate, I is investment, and K is the capital stock
dln μ/dt ≡ m = z(Λ)
m is rate of capital augmenting progress
Λ is rate of labor augmenting progress
Λ≡ dln λ/dt.
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Choice of direction function of relative shares (as before)—taking 
limit to continuous time
Z (Λ )≡ - d(lnz)/d(ln Λ) =  sL/ (1- sL) ≡Φ (κ)
Where (as before) sL is share of labor, which is just a function of the 
effective capital labor ratio, κ:
κ =μ K  /λL
Can solve for Λ as a function of κ:
Λ = z-1 (Φ (κ)) ≡ θ(κ).
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Evolution of economy described by: 
dln μ/dt= m = z(Λ) = z(θ(κ)).
dln κ /dt = dln K/dt + m – Λ – n
= S μ (f(κ )/ κ) + z (θ(κ)) - θ(κ)– n 
Where n is the rate of growth of population 
40
Steady State
• z (θ(κ*)) = 0





VI. Consequences of monetary policy in demand 
constrained macroeconomic equilibrium 
Illustration of general point
• Lower interest rate designed to stimulate investment
• But also lowers relative cost of capital (share of capital)
• Observed increase in return to capital related to monopoly/oligopoly rents
• Induces labor augmenting innovation—which (if elasticity of substitution is less than 
unity) reduces demand for labor
• Ambiguous effects in the short to medium run (benefit of more investment has to be 
set against cost of lower employment)
• Making it possibly more difficult to restore economy to full employment
• Intertemporal trade off in unemployment in demand constrained equilibrium
• Investment, aggregate demand, and employment increases in short run
• But labor required to meet future demand reduced
• Not a problem if monetary and fiscal policy can restore economy to full employment
• But is a problem if there are constraints, e.g. if future level of output is fixed, or if tere are 
constraints on monetary and fiscal policy
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VI. Sectoral reallocations can lead to innovation 
being Pareto inferior—and high unemployment
Discussion so far has ignored adjustment costs
With adjustments costs, even greater likelihood of welfare 
decreasing innovation, in absence of government interventions
There are government interventions that can ensure innovation is 
welfare increasing
• Combining Keynesian stimulation with industrial/sectoral policies
• Another application of basic insight:  what is individually rationale 
may not be collectively rational when there are “market failures”
• Innovation is rife with market failures
• These can be viewed as macroeconomic externalities
• Impacts of decisions in one sector on welfare of other sectors
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Simple model demonstrating this
Model provides explanation of what happened in Great Depression
• Technological change can affect different sectors differently, necessitating a reallocation of labor 
in first best equilibrium
• But reallocating labor is costly
• This is natural real rigidity in the system
• And there may be rigidities:  in decentralized economy, individuals in sector requiring 
“outmigration” may not have resources to move to new location and to get necessary education
• Their own human and financial capital (value of housing) may be impaired
• They cannot buy insurance against these contingencies; and most individuals do not buy the 
incomplete insurance that they could buy through structured finance
• Well understood capital market imperfections 
(Based on D. Delli Gatti, M. Gallegati, B. Greenwald,  A. Russo and J. E. Stiglitz, “Mobility Constraints, 
Productivity Trends, and Extended Crises,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,  2012, 83(3): 
375– 393 and "Sectoral Imbalances and Long Run Crises," in The Global Macro Economy and Finance,  F. 
Allen, M. Aoki, J.-P. Fitoussi, N. Kiyotaki, R. Gordon, and J.E. Stiglitz, eds., IEA Conference Volume No. 
150-III, Houndmills, UK and New York: Palgrave, 2012, pp. 61-97.)
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Disequilibrium impact on inequality
• Technological change has large distributive effects
• Destruction of value of physical and human capital
• Only if the individual could obtain perfect insurance at the time of birth 
(or before the conception of the innovation) would information about 
the advent of the job replacing innovation, and the advent itself, not be 
welfare reducing.  
• But someone born as an unskilled worker today, even under these 
conditions where he could buy insurance, will be worse off than he 
would have been had there not been such a possibility—unless the 
government engages in ex ante lump sum redistributions to compensate 
the individuals for the decrease in ex ante expected utility. 47
Clear parallels to situation today
Economy could be caught in a low level equilibrium trap
Government can play an important role in increasing welfare, in some cases, a Pareto improvement, in others reducing inequality, improving the plight 
of workers
Policies to facilitate transition and ensure a welfare enhancing long run equilibrium (with greater equality) include:
• Policies to increase wages of even low skilled jobs
• High aggregate demand—to ensure low unemployment rate
• Wage subsidy
• Minimum wage—also would (together with other measures) help encourage innovations that increase productivity of labor at the bottom
• High wages in public sector—to help drive up wages in economy more generally
• Other policies to encourage attractiveness of such jobs and increase respect for them
• “Wage share” tax:  profit tax increased if wage share (appropriately defined) is lower
• Vastly expanded Earned income tax credit—to ensure that no one who works full time is in poverty
• Does it make a difference whether individuals or jobs are subsidized? 
• More effective anti-trust laws, more effectively enforced
• Reducing rents associated with patents
• Narrowing breadth and duration of patents
• And circumscribing use of patents to create monopolies
• An increase in labor-demand increasing public investments
48
Further policies:  facilitating 
transition and shaping innovation
• Elimination of tax deduction for interest and the imposition of a tax 
on capital—to induce more capital augmenting innovation
• High carbon tax—to encourage resource saving innovation, at the 
expense of labor saving innovation
• Would simultaneously address two of most serious global problems
• More reliance on public research
• Directing research towards resource saving innovation and away 
from labor using innovation
• With government appropriating returns
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Great Depression as an historical 
example
• Innovation in agriculture combined with price and income inelastic 
demand led to increase in supply, decrease in agricultural prices 
and income
• When pace of innovation was moderate and other circumstances 
favorable, individuals could migrate out of agriculture sector to 
urban sector—earlier in 20’s, from 30% of population to 25% (a 
one-sixth decline) 
• In late twenties, marked fall in prices (in some cases by 75%) and 
income (by more than 50%), with effects amplified by resulting 
financial sector distress:  migration stopped—labor was trapped
• Decreased demand for urban goods
• With efficiency wages employment in urban sector decreased
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Basic Model
Two sectors (industry, agriculture)
(1)  βα =  βDAA (p, pα) + E DMA (p , w* )
(2)  H(E) = βDAM (p, pα) + E DMM (p , w* ) + I
β is the labor force in agriculture, (1 - β) is the labor force in industry, 
α is productivity in agriculture,
Dij is demand from those in sector i for goods from sector j
w* is the (fixed) efficiency wage in the urban sector,
I is the level of investment (assumed to be industrial goods), 
p is the price of agricultural goods in terms of manufactured goods, 
which is chosen as the numeraire, and 
E is the level of employment  (E ≤ 1 - β);
and where we have normalized the labor force at unity.
H(E) is the total production of industrial goods




• Demand equals supply of agricultural goods
Higher employment in manufacturing leads to higher demand for 
food, and hence higher p.
• Demand equals supply of manufactured goods
Higher price of agriculture goods leads to higher income in rural 
sector, and thus more manufacturing employment
Can be multiple equilibria 
Most of analysis focuses on impact on (stable) equilibrium from 




Normally (under stability condition, other plausible 
conditions) with immobile labor
an increase in agricultural productivity unambiguously 
yields a reduction in the relative price of agriculture 
and in employment in manufacturing. 
The result of mobility-constrained agricultural sector 
productivity growth is an extended economy-wide slump
54
55Figure 7: The effects of an increase in agricultural productivity
Government Expenditures
• Under the stability condition, an increase in government 
expenditure increases urban employment and raises agricultural 
prices and incomes
• In figure 7, productivity shock shifts employment from E* to E’
• Keynesian stimulus brings economy back to E*
Even though problem is structural, Keynesian policies work
Even more effective if spending is directed at underlying structural problem
• Migration subsidy can help economy adjust, overcoming market 
imperfection 56
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Figure 8: Impact of Keynesian stimulus: 
an increase of G shifts the MM curve from M’M’ to M’’M’’ 
and increases both employment and rural prices
58Figure 9: Effects of Migration Subsidy
Emerging from the Great Depression
• New Deal was not big enough to offset negative effects of declining farm 
income
• And New Deal was not sustained
• Cutbacks in 1937 in response to worries about fiscal deficit led once again to a downturn
• And much of Federal spending offset by cutbacks at state and local level
• WWII was a massive Keynesian stimulus
• Moved people from rural to urban sector
• Provided them with training
• Especially in conjunction with GI bill
• It was thus an “industrial policy” as well as a Keynesian stimulus policy
• Forced savings during War provided stimulus to buy goods after War
• In contrast to the legacy of debt now
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Wages
In model, under normal conditions, lowering urban wages 
lowers agricultural prices and urban employment
• High (rigid) wages are not the problem
• Lowering wages would lower aggregate demand—worsen the 
problem
• In this crisis, the US—country with most flexible labor 
market—has had poor job performance, worse than many 
others
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61Figure 10: The effects of downward wage adjustments
VII. Relationship between Technological 
Progress and Globalization
• Globalization can be viewed as a change in technology—expanding 
production possibilities
• Ideas presented here apply:
• In standard neoclassical model, new equilibrium entails unskilled workers worse off 
in advanced countries (factor price equalization theorem, illustrated by figure 1)
• Weakening of workers’ bargaining power moves new equilibrium to an even more 
disadvantageous position
• Argument that redistribution is costly implies we are in regime illustrated by figure 
2—workers objecting to trade liberalization understandable
• With imperfect risk and capital markets and frictions free trade may be Pareto 
inferior (Newbery Stiglitz 1984, Stiglitz 2017) (Figure 3)
• Especially relevant for recent trade agreements:  effect of TPP on GDP negligible, but it 
may still have had distributive effects
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Concluding Remarks:  Theory of growth
• Solow reconciled disparity between warranted and natural rate of growth 
by assuming neoclassical production function
• Theory of biased induced innovation shows alternative way of 
reconciliation
• With technology adjusting, even when at any moment there are fixed 
coefficients
• In Solow, distribution of income is determined by factor supplies, with 
given technology.  Distribution of income plays no role in evolution of 
economy
• In fixed coefficients induced innovation model, efficiency wage theory 
determines distribution which affects evolution of economy
• Markedly different dynamics
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Concluding remarks:  innovation and unemployment
• Presumption that economy is not efficient in pattern of 
innovation
• Excessive investment in labor saving innovations
• Resulting in too high a level of unemployment, too low wages
• Insufficient investment in innovations saving the planet
• Example of macroeconomic externality
• Resulting in lower wages and higher unemployment
• Pace of innovation may not be sensitive to ability of economy to 
absorb “shocks”
• Important non-linearities:  if pace is too fast, innovation can lead to 
lower output, not just lower wages
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Concluding remarks:  policy
• Wages affect evolution of productivity
• Wage compression policies of Scandinavia lead to increased productivity of unskilled workers (unskilled 
bias t.c.)
• Minimum wages may have similar effects
• Putting additional burden of fiscal and monetary policy to maintain full employment
• Increasing carbon price may shift innovation towards those which save the planet
• May be desirable to have a tax on robots (more generally, on labor saving innovations) to help 
internalize externality
• May be desirable to stabilize pace of innovation (variety of tools by which this may be done)
• Monetary policy needs to be sensitive to effects on induced innovation
• May be trade-off between unemployment today and unemployment later
• Active policies—Keynesian industrial policies—can lower unemployment, increase output, facilitate 
transitions
• In absence of active government policies, innovation from a decentralized market economy may be 
welfare reducing
• Especially if redistributions are constrained/costly
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Concluding Remarks
• The more willing society is to support the necessary 
transition and to provide support to those who are “left 
behind,” the faster the pace of innovation that society can 
accommodate, and still ensure that the outcomes are Pareto 
and welfare improvements.  
• A society that is not willing to engage in such actions should 
expect resistance to innovation, with uncertain political and 
economic consequences. (Korinek and Stiglitz, 2017)
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